The First World War as a media event

von by Christian Götter Original aufOriginal in German, angezeigt aufdisplayed in English
PublishedErschienen: 2021-08-26
    Print Drucken E-mailE-mail XML MetadataXML Metadaten   

    During the course of the First World War, the armed forces involved increasingly attempted to construct individual incidents of the war as media events in an effort to use them to influence the course of the war overall. This gave rise to narratives that were, to a degree, in competition with each other, although they were based on the same occurrences. This phenomenon is illustrated below via the example of the Battle of Jutland, a naval battle of the conflict. The First World War, it is argued, was not a single media event, but was constructed in the form of multiple media events – even though propaganda experts on the Allied side and German right-wing nationalist circles on the other side retrospectively attempted to re-construct the conflict as a whole as having been shaped by the media, and thus as 'one' media event.

    InhaltsverzeichnisTable of Contents

    The First World War as a Media Event

    The First World War was not a media event.1 However, so this article’s hypothesis, during the course of the conflict, the combatants increasingly aimed at the construction of media events as part of their own war effort and attempted to use them to influence their own populations, neutral states, their respective allies and enemies. Individual occurrences that were highlighted as media events from among the many that made up the war were intended to give structure to the war and provide orientation for the public. Frequently, different constructions of one and the same event competed with each other. According to this interpretation, the First World War was not a media event, but rather consisted of numerous media events (and no less frequently of media non-events), which were constructed by the powers engaged in the conflict.

    The war correspondents based at the War Press Office were an example of this. From the beginning of the war, they set about constructing the daily occurrences "at the front" as reportable events for their readers back home solely on the basis of army reports.2 As the war progressed, filmsHow Britain Prepared, Werbeanzeige aus The Moving Picture World, 1916; Bildquelle: Wikimedia Commons,, gemeinfrei. – such as the famous The Battle of the SommeThe Battle of the Somme 1916 (Ausschnitt) – were also increasingly viewed as important. They too created events that linked together into a narrative across the years of trench warfare, in order to strengthen the resolve of the "home front"Schulmädchen stricken für die Front, 1917–1918[Who Made These Little Islands..., Flugblatt, 758 x 511 mm, 1915, Herausgeber: PARLIAMENTARY RECRUITING COMMITTEE; Bildquelle: © IWM (Art.IWM PST 11670),, IWM Non Commercial Licence,], although, due to the technological capabilities of the time, these medially (re)constructed events of the war always contained reconstructed scenes.3 Ultimately, the very identity of the respective enemy as a group was created by media events. Even postcardsHow the Hun Hates, Lithographie, 754 x 511 mm, 1915, Künstler: Wilson, David & W F B, Druckerei: Dangerfield Printing Co. Ltd; Bildquelle: © IWM (Art.IWM PST 13551),, IWM Non Commercial Licence, and postersDestroy this mad brute - Enlist - U.S. Army, Lithographie, 106 x 71 cm, ca. 1917, Künstler: Harry R. Hopps; Bildquelle: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Reproduction Number: LC-DIG-ds-03216,, gemeinfrei.[British Empire Union post-World War I, poster, 1919, unbekannter Ersteller; Bildquelle: United States Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Reproduction Number: LC-USZC4-11170,, gemeinfrei.] played a central role in the successful construction of the image of the barbaric enemy as the "Boche" and the "Hun" by and propagandistsAnti-German propaganda labels, Sammelmarken, 1915, Ersteller: Winox; Bildquelle: Wikimedia Commons,, gemeinfrei..4

    Notwithstanding the variety of different media available, during the First World War newspapers played a dominant role in disseminating news and interpreting the conflict politically,5 and notwithstanding the illustrative power of photographs, it was textual reporting that narrated the war.6 This article thus focuses on textual newspaper reporting while constructing the argument for the central thesis. It first discusses the Battle of Jutland as an example of the construction of a contested media event. This media event is then placed in the context of the considerations of the British and German armed forces involved in the battle regarding the use of media and the construction of media events as an element of warfare. The British and German armed forces were chosen as examples because these central parties to the conflict pursued a particularly active media strategy not only during the war itself, but also beyond it, and they each repeatedly referred to the other's media strategy.7 Finally, a second thesis is briefly introduced – the thesis that after the end of the war there were indeed groups that were interested in reconstructing the First World War retrospectively as one media event. But first, to the Battle of Jutland.

    The Media Battle of Jutland

    The Battle of Jutland8 on 31 May and 1 June 1916 was the largest naval engagement of the war between the British Grand FleetBattle of Jutland Victory Scroll 1916 and the German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte). It occurred largely "out of sight" not only of the broader public of the nations involved, but also of the military commands of both countries, and even of most of the people directly involved, who experienced it in the interior of ships. Most of the battles of the war exhibited a similar non-visibility, but it was particularly conspicuous in the case of this engagement at sea. The latter was subsequently constructed in the media by the military commands of both sides with the help of journalists as a success for their own side. Versions of the battle were constructed that were in opposition to each other – competing media events. They were intended to convince the people at home and neutral states of one's own victory, to sow doubt in the enemy country, and to motivate one's own allies.

    How these opposing media events were constructed with regard to the aims referred to above is illustrated by an analysis of reporting in the liberal Berliner Tageblatt and in The Times of London. In the first week of June 1916, which is focused here, the Berliner Tageblatt was still endeavouring to adhere to the dictate of avoiding domestic political discord (Burgfrieden), and The Times was owned by Lord Northcliffe (Alfred Harmsworth, 1865–1922). As regards their coverage of the naval battle, these two newspapers were representative of the respective broader press landscapes of the two countries. In the first two weeks after the naval battle, they reported intensively on the event, publishing official reports, reports by their own journalists, commentaries and leading articles on the topic, as well as reports from the press of enemy countries, of allied countries and of neutral states. They continued to carry reports of the event even after 5 June 1916, when the death of Lord Kitchener (Herbert Kitchener, 1850–1916[Kitchener Wants You 1914]) temporarily dominated the headlines. After two weeks, the intensity of coverage of the battle began to wane, though it subsequently increased again in response to specific events, such as the publication of the official report of the British commander Admiral John Jellicoe (1859–1935) in July 1916.

    The media versions of the battle on both sides were rooted in the progress of the naval engagement. The battle had begun on 31 May 1916 in the sea off Jutland9 and continued until the early hours of 1 June. Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer (1863–1928), who had been appointed commander of the German High Seas Fleet at the beginning of the year, had actually only intended to engage and weaken parts of the British Grand Fleet. But as German radio communications had been decoded, Jellicoe was aware of German plans. He put to sea before the enemy in order to meet him with the entire Grand Fleet. However, initially it was the fast battle cruisers of both sides that engaged each other, with the British side suffering comparatively heavy losses. Then the main body of both fleets came into contact. The German navy soon withdrew from this engagement badly weakened. During the night, it was mainly small units of both sides that were active. The next morning, the German fleet returned to its ports. It had inflicted heavier losses on the British fleet than it had suffered itself, but Britain remained in command of the seas.10

    As the German fleet had returned to port before the British fleet, the German Admiralty was able to put out the first official reports of the engagement in the North Sea. A report in the morning edition of the Berliner Tageblatt on 2 June 1916 stated that there had been a "successful naval battle against the main body of the English [sic] fleet".11 German navy command related the scale of the success to the numbers of ships lost by each side.12 Two German ships had been lost and one was missing compared with the loss of at least six British ships.13 Over the subsequent days, the German side gradually admitted the full scale of its losses, which, in total, were still less than the British ones.14 Writing in the evening addition of the Tageblatt on 2 June, the newspaper's naval expert, retired captain-at-sea Lothar Persius (1864–1944),15 stressed that the Royal Navy had not only lost important ships, but also "prestige". Even though further German losses had been confirmed, he argued, the excellent performance of German sailors and German technology was undeniable. The German High Seas Fleet had delivered "a painful blow" – though he conceded that the Grand Fleet remained numerically superior to it.16

    The German Admiralty and the Berliner Tageblatt – which largely supported the Admiralty's version of the battle – pursued three aims in their representation of the naval battle. Firstly, they sought to protect the reputation of the German navy at home and to justify the many years of naval build-up that had preceded the war. Persius had already declared after the first official report of the battle that its outcome would "prompt the most exuberant joy and satisfaction in Germany".17 The president of the Reichstag, Johannes Kaempf (1842–1918), stressed in a speech to parliament that "a great and beautiful victory has been achieved by our young navy".18 The foreign edition of the Tageblatt subsequently explicitly stated that the policy of naval build-up had been proven right.19 Secondly, they sought to create or strengthen the impression in neutral countries that, while Germany was not on a par with Britain in terms of naval power, it was nonetheless not at Britain's mercy in this regard, and that Britain's naval dominance was by no means unchallenged.20 After all, Germany was still dependent on neutral shipping companies daring to transport goods for Germany in spite of the British naval blockade. Thirdly, the representation of the battle was intended to sow doubts about the British navy in the enemy camp and among Germany's allies in order to potentially influence the course of the war.

    These three aims were also pursued on the British side – albeit with the roles reversed. In the case of the last two aims, those who constructed the media version of the naval battle on the British and German sides went into direct competition with each other. However, because the Grand Fleet returned to port later than the German fleet, the British Admiralty began its efforts about a day after its German counterpart. The first reports appeared in The Times on 3 June. Initially, the reports seemed to confirm the jubilant German version, as the Admiralty conceded that the Grand Fleet had suffered heavy losses. However, the reports also stressed three aspects that were intended to relativise this. Firstly, the conditions in which the naval battle had been fought had greatly favoured the Germans. Secondly, losses had been inflicted on the enemy that were at least as great as those suffered by the British fleet. Thirdly, the German High Seas Fleet had fled shortly after the main body of the Grand Fleet had intervened in the battle.21

    The British Admiralty was also supported by journalists in its construction of the battle’s media version. At that, the part played by British journalists in shaping the media event was greater than that played by their German counterparts. The former criticised the state organs more openly. Their reports carried more information that had been acquired by their own research, which formed the basis of their own interpretation of events. In view of the delayed reporting, this was very much welcomed by the Admiralty, which had deliberately loosened censorship to this end.22 Thus, The Times not only supported the reports of the Admiralty with reports and commentary by its own correspondents, but also expanded on those reports. It emphasized that the German navy had only been successful while it had enjoyed a numerical advantage,23 and it stressed that ZeppelinsNach England! – Zeppeline über dem Ärmelkanaland mine-laying submarinesThe German Navy in the First World War, Schwarz-Weiß-Photographie, ca. 1915–1917, Photograph: German official photographer; Bildquelle:  © IWM (Q 20220), Imperial War Museum,, IWM Non Commercial Licence. had played an important role in German success. It had not been solely due to skilled seamanship and the quality of the German fleet,24 both of which were excellent on the British side.25 Above all, The Times stressed, the outcome of the naval battle had not changed the overall "naval situation": the blockade remained in place, the Allies were able to move freely on the high seas and Germany would still have to take on the Grand Fleet to change this.26

    In this way, the outline of the naval battle as a media event (or media events) was set up. According to the German version, a young navy, which due to shrewd political planning was well trained, excellently equipped and highly motivated, had taken on its superior enemy and had inflicted heavy losses in men, material and prestige on that enemy while suffering only light losses itself. According to the British media event, by contrast, the battle had been a defensive victory for Britain. Thanks to numerous conditions that were in its favour, the German fleet had inflicted heavy damage, but the Royal Navy with its long tradition of naval dominance had put the Germany fleet to flight, had inflicted just as heavy losses on the latter, and had repelled a challenge to Britain's naval supremacy. Over the subsequent days, these interpretations became more fixed, and their reception by target groups at home, in neutral countries, in allied countries and in the enemy country was tested.

    For the benefit of the domestic audience, The Times stressed that the losses suffered would only strengthen the resolve of the British people. "It will sting them to fresh exertion, it will dispel much idle and harmful optimism, it will steel their unalterable resolution to win this war or to perish."27 The newspaper regretted that the German side had been able to disseminate its "version of the fighting" in numerous neutral countries, describing that version as "as usual, exaggerated and misleading" and serving "for the moment [to] impress credulous neutrals, and even … to cause temporary discouragement amongst some of our Allies".28 But ultimately, Britain could depend on the ability of allies and neutral countries to judge for themselves, The Times stated.29 After all, the Stock Exchange had recovered from the fall in stocks that had occurred after the initial German reports of success30 and the media were already asking why the supposedly successful German fleet had retreated to its ports.31 On 5 June, The Times reported that the public view in the was that "Britannia still rules the waves".32 In allied France, The Times reported, the battle had resulted in the size of the British contribution to the war being publicly recognized for the first time.33

    On the German side, Persius argued on the day of the first British statements about the battle that it was to be expected that Great Britain would attempt to hide or relativize its own losses and "to construct" greater losses on the German side.34 Such "Legendenbildungen" (myth making) – as the German Admiralty described it in a further statement35 – was of course hopeless, as "the neutral press" knows "that the German Admiralty usually immediately admits to every loss".36 It was undeniable, according to Persius, that the High Seas Fleet "had succeeded again in delivering a mighty blow to that arrogant phrase 'Britannia rules the waves'".37 The Berliner Tageblatt carried numerous reports from neutral and allied countries that were intended to demonstrate that the version of the naval battle constructed in the German media was the one that corresponded to the naval reality.38 The newspaper quoted from articles, according to which the battle would "have the greatest consequences for global history".39 newspapers had – according to the Tageblatt – adjudged that the British "control of the seas now appears highly questionable".40 In the case of the British media, on 4 June the Tageblatt cited the Daily News as having supposedly acknowledged the British defeat.41 In response to British accusations that the German side was concealing its own losses,42 Persius stated that "nobody who is able to judge for themselves … is in the slightest doubt that the report of the [German] Admiralty regarding our losses is accurate".43 Even after the German navy had been forced to admit additional losses, which the British side made full use of to attack German credibility,44 Persius remained undeterred. Germany had achieved something great, he insisted. This was confirmed by "newspapers from enemy countries and neutral countries! Nobody can … deny that the battle represents a precious glorious chapter in German naval history".45

    The two versions of the naval battle as media events thus stood in direct competition with each other. They were bound up with the hope, which was formulated with the domestic audience in mind, that they could affect the course of the war. Josef Schwab (1865–1942) stressed in the weekly foreign edition of the Berliner Tageblatt on 6 June that the success of the German fleet had illustrated "that it is not possible to defeat the allied Central Powers". The "political significance of our victory" would have to be impressed upon the enemy nations so that they would declare their willingness to sue for peace.46 On the British side, Winston Churchill (1874–1965) viewed the battle as "a definite step towards the attainment of complete victory"47 and a leading article in The Times stated that it had strengthened the resolve of the country to the extent that it would resist the peace negotiations being suggested by neutral countries at the instigation of German agents. "The magnitude of our losses in men and in ships has burnt into us the grim resolve that these losses shall not have been in vain."48

    Neither of the two media events was able to win out over the other because, as the navy correspondent of The Times observed on 5 June, "[i]t can surprise nobody if both combatants claim a victory, the Germans because they were not beaten decisively in their first big engagement with the strongest Fleet in the world; and the British because they defeated the object of the enemy and forced him to fly for safety".49 Of course, this did not discourage either side from continuing to write in support of their own media version of the battle. The weekly edition of the Berliner Tageblatt of 14 June ended with a cartoon depicting two sailors in the North SeaZwischen Skagerrak und Horns Riff, 1916. The German sailor with his gun raised shouts triumphantly after the retreating Briton: "'Hey, Englishman, you lost something!' 'What?' 'Naval dominance!'"50

    The public controversy regarding the interpretation of the naval battle did not end during the course of the war, but continued in the years afterwards.51 One reason for this is that, ultimately, a case could be made for both versions of the battle. It can be said that two competing media events were constructed over the duration of the war and beyond, which were intended to influence the course of the war itself by motivating the domestic audience and allies, by drawing neutral countries onto one's own side, and by demoralizing the enemy. This approach was not a coincidence. During the course of the war, the British and German armed forces had increasingly attempted to influence the conflict by means of media reporting.52

    Media Events in the Media Strategies of the Armed Forces

    Prior to the First World War, the idea that human action could be influenced on a large scale with the help of media reporting received particular interest at the news service of the German Imperial Naval Office.5354 Based on experiences in peacetime and inspired by observations from the Russo-Japanese War, the idea was already expressed in January 1905 that in wartime the service should be used "for the publication of war news, war reports, etc., and in so doing potentially exert influence over the war".55 One year later, the German Admiralty adopted this idea and now held the view that in wartime the German navy would need a central office for working with the media, which "in the interests of our own war effort … publishes news in newspapers, … that in the public – specifically abroad – will be advantageous for our cause".56

    After the outbreak of war, the German navy started having reports published that suited its purposes from 3 August 1914 onward.57 The army was initially hesitant to follow its lead and viewed the provision of information to the media primarily as a quid pro quo for the cooperation of the media in maintaining secrecy regarding "militarily relevant" sites.58 The British military was similarly reticent to start with.59 However, in both countries the armed forces soon changed their attitude and began to push for media support for the war effort. From the winter of 1914/1915 onward, the German army had accounts of individual combat engagements prepared for the press. In December 1914, the quartermaster general, General Adolf Wild von Hohenborn (1860–1925), called for reports of heroic deeds, to "honour the heroes, engender pride in their relatives, and provide an incentive to the young units".60 According to General Erich von Falkenhayn (1861–1922), a Kriegsnachrichtenstelle61 (war news service) should "on the basis of battle reports, present to the public individual, discrete battle operations, while primarily focusing on exceptional deeds by units or individuals".62 In other words, military occurrences were to be transformed into media events to motivate domestic civilian society to support the war effort. This support was considered crucial. In the words of Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke (1848–1916): "The outcome of the war does not depend on the army alone. The nation itself bears half of the responsibility for the outcome of the war. The attitude that we adopt at home affects the attitude of our soldiers through a million threads."63 These efforts to influence the mood at home were expanded during the course of the war.64 The British military followed the German example closely, and though the media in Britain were allowed greater space for their own initiative, leading representatives of the army such as Field Marshall Douglas Haig (1861–1928) used censorship and personal connections to journalists to turn reports of military developments into media events that suited their purpose.65

    Together with domestic audiences, neutral states were also a target of these media events. Here too, it the German armed forces became active first. One of their main aims was to portray their strategy of using submarines against merchant ships as a legitimate reaction to the blockade of Germany.66 In response, the British military, which viewed the use of media coverage in this context as a "fourth weapon",67 presented its own perspective at regular conferences and put out official reports, such as those of Haig.68 The construction of the Battle of Jutland as a media event demonstrates in exemplary fashion how much the armed forces of both sides cared about how neutral states judged their interpretations of military events. It also shows how closely the two combatants observed each other's media coverage.

    The naval battle was in fact a pivotal point in the media activities of the armed forces during the war. Under the constant observation of the enemy, this work was increasingly intensified during the second half of the conflict, and it was understood as a means of weakening the enemy, not least in terms of the resolve of its civilian population. Shortly before the engagement between the two battle fleets in the North Sea, the German naval media expert Karl Boy-Ed (1872–1930) had emphasized how important it was "to support the naval war effort through the press whenever possible".69 He was also in favour of the army engaging in such activities because, in his view, the war was increasingly "being one of public opinions" and "deeds alone will not get it done in our time of press dominance!"70 To him, the "deeds", ranging from military operations to German victories, also had to be portrayed in the right way in the media in order to affect the course of the war. In other words, they had to be staged as media events. He was not alone in this view. In early 1918, First Quartermaster-General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937) stressed that it was the duty of those producing reports for the military office at the department of foreign affairs "to exploit politically in neutral and enemy countries the military successes of German arms by publicising them in words, images, films and oral propaganda".71 For him, the media portrayal of one's own successes was "an aid to achieving victory",72 the aim of which was "to destroy the will of the enemy's home front to continue the war by making correct propagandistic use of our military victories".73 In the strategic thinking of the supreme army command, turning battles into media events was crucial to successfully prosecuting the war in view of the military stalemate at the front. Compared to this position, the British armed forces were more reticent. Nonetheless, they also took an interest in the media portrayal of military engagements and they shared the view that this portrayal could affect the outcome of engagements. For example, Haig was eager to have the Battle of the Somme presented as a success in the media,74 and the taking of in late 1917 was turned into a media event through the careful staging of the entry of the British into the city under General Edmund Allenby (1861–1936)[General Allenby's entrance into Jerusalem].75 However, on the British side it was primarily politicians and journalists who sought to influence the war by means of skilfully constructed media events. The newspaper owner Lord Beaverbrook (Max Aitken, 1879–1964), who was appointed minister of information during the war, asserted that the media aspect of the war was "not less vital for victory than fleets and armies".76

    In spite of the importance that was attributed to the media portrayal of the First World War while the war was ongoing, ultimately it was not decided in the media but by the logistical, numerical and military superiority of the Allies with the assistance of the USA – even if this view was not shared by everyone in the aftermath of the war.

    The First World War as a Media Event

    After the weapons had (largely) fallen silent and the First World War had ended, there were those who were still convinced that the media aspect had been decisive.77 They included those on the Allied side who were viewed as successful propagandists, and who asserted even outside their own circles that their work had made a vital contribution to the outcome of the war.78 In Germany, right-wing nationalist circles seized on the influence of the media as a way of explaining their own defeat without admitting military inferiority. The ground was already prepared for this interpretation when Moltke declared in 1915 that the domestic population would carry part of the responsibility for the outcome of the war. In November 1918, Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) carried this interpretation forward by asserting that the enemy had "succeeded in depressing the mood on our side at home and in the army through planned propaganda".79 These were the first building blocks of the Dolchstoßlegende (stab-in-the-back myth) and the central basis of National Socialist enthusiasm for propaganda.80 At the heart of that propaganda was the reinterpretation of the First World War as a conflict that had been decided through the skilful control of the media, or, to put it another way, a retrospective construction of the First World War as a media event.

    Christian Götter



    [Anonymous]: Erfolgreiche Seeschlacht gegen den Hauptteil der englischen Flotte, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung: Morgen-Ausgabe (02/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Erstürmung des Caillette-Waldes: Die siegreiche Seeschlacht im Skagerrak, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung: Abend-Ausgabe (02/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Great Naval Battle: 'Heavy Losses.' Six British Cruisers Sunk: Eight Destroyers Lost: German Version: Admitted Loss of a Battleship: Enemy Fleet Battered, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Later Report: The Enemy Losses in Battleships, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Late War News: German Sailors' Story: British at First Outnumbered: Flight Before the Grand Fleet, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Zeppelins in the Fight: Reports by Eye-Witnesses: Experiences of Neutral Ships, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: The Naval Battle, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Effect in Wall-Street, in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: The Naval Battle: German Rejoicings: 'Greatest Modern Sea Fight', in: The Times (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Der Bericht der britischen Admiralität über die Seeschlacht, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Abend-Ausgabe (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Die Freude bei den Verbündeten, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Morgen-Ausgabe (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Der Eindruck bei den Neutralen, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Morgen-Ausgabe (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Schwedische Anerkennung des deutschen Seesieges, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Abend-Ausgabe (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Die Stimmung in England nach der Schlacht: Englische Pressestimmen über die Seeschlacht, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Morgen-Ausgabe (04/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Neutrale Pressestimmen über den deutschen Seesieg, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Morgen-Ausgabe (04/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Karikatur in Berliner Tageblatt: Wochen-Ausgabe für Ausland und Übersee (14/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]:  'A Vigorous Fight.': Statement by the Admiralty, in: The Times (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Churchills Auffassung von der Seeschlacht, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Abend-Ausgabe (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: A Summing up by Mr. Churchill: 'Step Towards Complete Victory.', in: The Times (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: The Battle Reconstructed: Enemy Conditions: Questions of Time and Place: All-Night Pursuit, in: The Times (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Late War News. 'Britannia Still Rules the Waves.' American View of Battle, in: The Times (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Foreign Views of the Battle. French Tributes to the Fleet. 'The Blockade of Germany Continues.', in: The Times (05/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: After the Battle, in: The Times (06/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: Die englischen und die deutschen Verluste in der Seeschlacht am Skagerrak, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung: Morgen-Ausgabe (08/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: The German Communiqués. False Statement Denied by British Admiralty, in: The Times (09/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous]: The Truth by Degrees: Object of the Belated Admission, in: The Times (09/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    [Anonymous], Sarcastic Dutch Comment, in: The Times (09/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    Persius, Lothar: Die Bedeutung des Seesieges, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung: Abend-Ausgabe (02/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    Persius, Lothar: Die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung, Morgen-Ausgabe (03/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    Persius, Lothar: Betrachtungen zur Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak, in: Berliner Tageblatt und Handels-Zeitung: Morgen-Ausgabe (10/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    Schwab, Josef: Der Grosse Tag unserer Flotte: Die politische Lage, in: Berliner Tageblatt: Wochen-Ausgabe für Ausland und Übersee (06/06/1916). URL: [2021-08-19]

    Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich: MKr 13873. URL: (catalogue entry), StvGenKdoIAK 1740. URL: (catalogue entry) [2021-08-19]

    Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg: RM 3/10371. URL: (catalogue entry), RM 5/3736. URL: (catalogue entry), RM 5/3740. URL: (catalogue entry) [2021-08-19]

    Brownrigg, Rear Adm. Sir Douglas: Indiscretions of the Naval Censor, London 1920. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Charteris, John: At G.H.Q., London 1931. URL: / URL: [2021-08-19]

    Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe: 456 F1/367. URL: (catalogue entry), 456 F1/372. URL: (catalogue entry), 456 F1/377. URL: (catalogue entry), 456 F6/225. URL: (catalogue entry), 456 F8/316. URL: (catalogue entry) [2021-08-19]

    Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart: E 40/72 Bü 553. URL: (catalogue entry) [2021-08-19]

    Lloyd George, David: War Memoirs, London 1934, vol. 4. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Ponsonby, Arthur: Falsehood in War-Time: Containing an Assortment of Lies Circulated Throughout the Nations During the Great War, London 1928. URL: [2021-08-19]

    The National Archives, Kew: Inf 4/9. URL: (catalogue entry), WO 106/6397. URL: (catalogue entry), WO 158/897. URL: (catalogue entry) [2021-08-19]

    Vogel, Walter: Die Organisation des amtlichen Presse- und Nachrichtenwesens des Deutschen Reiches von den Anfängen unter Bismarck bis zum Beginn des Jahres 1933, in: Zeitungswissenschaft: Monatsschrift für internationale Zeitungsforschung 16 (1941), pp. 1–108.


    Badsey, Stephen: Battle of the Somme: British War-Propaganda, in: Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 3 (1983), pp. 99–115. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Balfour, Michael L. G.: Propaganda in War 1939–1945: Organisations, Policies and Politics in Britain and Germany, London 1979.

    Barth, Boris: Dolchstoßlegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1933, Düsseldorf 2003.

    Bar-Yosef, Eitan: The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917–1918, in: Journal of Contemporary History 36 (2001), pp. 87–110. URL: / URL: [2021-08-19]

    Bösch, Frank et al. (eds.): Medialisierte Ereignisse: Performanz, Inszenierung und Medien seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt-on-Main 2010.

    Bösch, Frank: Europäische Medienereignisse, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG) Mainz 2010-12-03. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Brocks, Christine: Die bunte Welt des Krieges: Bildpostkarten aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg 1914–1918, Essen 2008.

    Bruendel, Steffen: Othering/Atrocity Propaganda, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Cornwall, Mark: Propaganda at Home (Austria-Hungary), in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2019-04-25. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Creutz, Martin: Die Pressepolitik der kaiserlichen Regierung während des Ersten Weltkriegs: Die Exekutive, die Journalisten und der Teufelskreis der Berichterstattung, Frankfurt-on-Main 1996 (Europäische Hochschulschriften 3: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 704).

    Deist, Wilhelm: Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda: Das Nachrichtenbureau des Reichsmarineamtes 1897–1914, Stuttgart 1976. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Epkenhans, Michael: Jutland, Battle of, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2016-03-15. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Epkenhans, Michael et al. (eds.): Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte – Ereignis – Verarbeitung, 2nd edition, Munich 2011 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 66).

    Götter, Christian: Die Macht der Wirkungsannahmen: Medienarbeit des britischen und deutschen Militärs in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Berlin et al. 2016. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Grove, Eric: Die Erinnerung an die Skagerrakschlacht in Großbritannien, in: Michael Epkenhans et al. (eds.): Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte – Ereignis – Verarbeitung, 2nd edition, Munich 2011 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 66), pp. 301–308.

    Hiley, Nicholas Peter: Making War: The British News Media and Government Control, 1914–1916, Milton Keynes 1984.

    Hillmann, Jörg: Die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak in der deutschen Erinnerung, in: Michael Epkenhans et al. (eds.): Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte – Ereignis – Verarbeitung, 2nd edition, Munich 2011 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 66), pp. 309–350.

    Holzer, Anton: Die andere Front: Fotografie und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, 3rd edition, Darmstadt 2012.

    Jaworski, Rudolf: Mütter – Liebchen – Heroinen: Propagandapostkarten aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Cologne 2015. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Keisinger, Florian: Press/Journalism, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Kindler, Jan: Die Skagerrakschlacht im deutschen Film, in: Michael Epkenhans et al. (eds.): Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte – Ereignis – Verarbeitung, 2nd edition, Munich 2011 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 66), pp. 351–368.

    Löffelholz, Martin (ed.): Krieg als Medienereignis: Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Krisenkommunikation, Opladen 1993. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Löffelholz, Martin (ed.): Krieg als Medienereignis II: Krisenkommunikation im 21. Jahrhundert, Wiesbaden 2004. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Murawski, Erich: Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht 1939–1945: Ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung der geistigen Kriegführung: Mit einer Dokumentation der Wehrmachtberichte vom 1.7.1944 bis zum 9.4.1945, Boppard am Rhein 1962.

    Preußer, Heinz-Peter (ed.): Krieg in den Medien, Amsterdam et al. 2005.

    Rahn, Werner: Die Seeschlacht vor dem Skagerrak: Verlauf und Analyse aus deutscher Perspektive, in: Michael Epkenhans et al. (eds.): Skagerrakschlacht: Vorgeschichte – Ereignis – Verarbeitung, 2nd edition, Munich 2011 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 66), pp. 139–286.

    Rojek, Sebastian: Versunkene Hoffnungen: Die Deutsche Marine im Umgang mit Erwartungen und Enttäuschungen 1871–1930, Berlin et al. 2017. URL: [2021-08-19]

    Steinkamp, Peter: Kapitän zur See a. D. Lothar Persius: Ein Seeoffizier als Kritiker der deutschen Flottenpolitik (1864–1944), in: Wolfram Wette (ed.): Pazifistische Offiziere in Deutschland 1871–1933, Bremen 1999 (Geschichte & Frieden 10), pp. 99–109.


    1. ^ Since the 1990s, wars and individual battles have been increasingly discussed as events that are (also) constructed through the media. Initially this occurred in communication studies, particularly on the topic of war reporting, but subsequently also in historical studies, and increasingly with regard to events in conflicts from the early modern period onward. See Löffelholz, Medienereignis 1993; Löffelholz, Medienereignis II 2004; Preußer, Medien 2005; Bösch, Ereignisse 2010. For a brief introduction, see Bösch, Medienereignisse 2010.
    2. ^ Cornwall, Propaganda 2019.
    3. ^ On the Battle of the Somme, see Badsey, Battle 1983.
    4. ^ Bruendel, Othering 2014; for example Jaworski, Mütter 2015, p. 37; also Brocks, Welt 2008.
    5. ^ See also Keisinger, Press 2014.
    6. ^ Holzer, Front 2012, p. 15.
    7. ^ See also Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016.
    8. ^ Referred to in German as the Skagerrakschlacht (Battle of Skagerrak).
    9. ^ Off the Skagerrak, when viewed from the base of Germany’s High Seas Fleet.
    10. ^ There is a brief overview in Epkenhans, Jutland 2016. For a more detailed account with important documentary sources, see Rahn, Seeschlacht 2011, passim.
    11. ^ [Anonymous], Erfolgreiche Seeschlacht 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "[e]rfolgreiche Seeschlacht gegen den Hauptteil der englischen Flotte").
    12. ^ For a comprehensive analysis of the media representation, including a comparison with the internal evaluation of the German Admiralty, see Hillmann, Seeschlacht 2011, pp. 317–325.
    13. ^ [Anonymous], Erfolgreiche Seeschlacht 1916.
    14. ^ [Anonymous], Die englischen und die deutschen Verluste 1916.
    15. ^ For an overview of his relationship with the German navy in the context of its media activities, see Rojek, Hoffnungen 2017, pp. 78–81; on Persius generally, see Steinkamp, Persius 1999.
    16. ^ Persius, Die Bedeutung des Seesieges 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "ein empfindlicher Schlag").
    17. ^ [Anonymous], Erfolgreiche Seeschlacht 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "in Deutschland lebhafteste Freude und Genugtuung hervorrufen").
    18. ^ [Anonymous], Erstürmung 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "seitens unserer jungen Marine ein großer schöner Erfolg erzielt worden ist").
    19. ^ Schwab, Der Grosse Tag unserer Flotte 1916.
    20. ^ On the aims behind the suppression of information, see also Rahn, Seeschlacht 2011, pp. 188f.
    21. ^ [Anonymous], Great Naval Battle 1916; [Anonymous], Later Report 1916.
    22. ^ Brownrigg, Indiscretions 1920, pp. 62–73.
    23. ^ [Anonymous], Late War News 1916.
    24. ^ [Anonymous], Zeppelins in the Fight 1916.
    25. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle 1916.
    26. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle 1916.
    27. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle 1916.
    28. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle 1916.
    29. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle 1916.
    30. ^ [Anonymous], Effect in Wall-Street 1916.
    31. ^ [Anonymous], The Naval Battle: German Rejoicings 1916.
    32. ^ [Anonymous], Late War News 1916.
    33. ^ [Anonymous], Foreign Views of the Battle 1916.
    34. ^ Persius, Lothar: Die Seeschlacht 1916.
    35. ^ [Anonymous], Der Bericht der britischen Admiralität 1916.
    36. ^ Persius, Lothar: Die Seeschlacht 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "[d]ie neutrale Presse", "daß der deutsche Admiralstab jeden Verlust meist sofort einräumte").
    37. ^ Persius, Lothar: Die Seeschlacht 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "gelang, jenem übermütigen Wort 'Britannia rules the waves' wieder einen kräftigen Stoß zu geben").
    38. ^ [Anonymous], Die Freude bei den Verbündeten 1916; [Anonymous], Der Eindruck bei den Neutralen 1916.
    39. ^ [Anonymous], Neutrale Pressestimmen 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "die größten weltgeschichtlichen Folgen haben").
    40. ^ [Anonymous], Schwedische Anerkennung 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "Herrschaft über die See erweist sich nun im höchsten Grade als zweifelhaft").
    41. ^ [Anonymous], Die Stimmung in England 1916.
    42. ^ [Anonymous], 'A Vigorous Fight.' 1916.
    43. ^ [Anonymous], Churchills Auffassung 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "Kein Urteilsfähiger … hegt daran einen Zweifel, daß der Admiralstabsbericht über unsere Verluste zutreffend ist").
    44. ^ [Anonymous], The German Communiqués 1916; [Anonymous], The Truth by Degrees 1916.
    45. ^ Persius, Lothar: Betrachtungen zur Seeschlacht 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "Zeitungsstimmen aus Feindesland und aus Neutralien! Niemand kann … abstreiten, daß die Schlacht ein kostbares Ruhmesblatt in der deutschen Seekriegsgeschichte bildet").
    46. ^ Schwab, Josef: Der Grosse Tag unserer Flotte 1916 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "dass die verbündeten Mittelmächte nicht mehr niederzuringen sind", "politische Bedeutung dieses unseres Sieges").
    47. ^ [Anonymous], A Summing up 1916.
    48. ^ [Anonymous], After the Battle 1916.
    49. ^ [Anonymous], The Battle Reconstructed 1916.
    50. ^ [Anonymous], Karikatur  1916.
    51. ^ For a brief account of the British side, see Grove, Erinnerung 2011; for the German side, see Hillmann, Seeschlacht 2011; on films, see Kindler, Skagerrakschlacht 2011, p. 354.
    52. ^ On the relationships of cooperation and competition that developed both with journalists and politicians, see Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016, pp. 105–219.
    53. ^ On the history of this, see Deist, Flottenpropaganda 1976.
    54. ^ On other media activities in the British and German militaries before the war, see Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016, pp. 29–61.
    55. ^ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BAMA), Schreiben Varrentrapps, 8/1/1905, RM 3/10371, Bl. 50 f (transl. by N. Williams, original: "für die Veröffentlichung von Kriegsnachrichten, der Kriegsberichte etc., sowie zu einer hierdurch möglichen Beeinflussung der Kriegslage").
    56. ^ BAMA, Schreiben Büchsels, 2.4.1906, BAMA, RM 3/10371, Bl. 127 f (transl. by N. Williams, original: "im Interesse der eigenen Kriegführung … Nachrichten in die Zeitungen bringt, … von denen man sich im Allgemeinen – namentlich im Auslande – einen Vorteil für die eigene Sache verspricht").
    57. ^ See Murawski, Wehrmachtbericht 1962, p. 23.
    58. ^ Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016, pp. 112–114.
    59. ^ Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016, pp. 115–122.
    60. ^ Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe (GLAK), Generalquartiermeister West (Zoellner) Ia Nr. 6521, 7.12.1914, 456 F6/225 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "den Helden zur Ehre, ihren Angehörigen zum Stolz, den jungen Mannschaften zum Ansporn").
    61. ^ On the institutional history of German military media activity in the First World War, see for example Creutz, Pressepolitik 1996 and, to be read critically, Vogel, Organisation 1941.
    62. ^ GLAK, Chef Generalstab des Feldheeres, M.J. Nr. 12150 K, 24.12.1914, 456 F1/367 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "an der Hand der Gefechtsberichte einzelne in sich abgeschlossene Gefechtshandlungen, vor allem unter Berücksichtigung hervorragender Leistungen von Truppen oder Einzelpersonen der Öffentlichkeit [...] übergeben").
    63. ^ Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Stuttgart, reproduction of the interview in the Münchener neueste Nachrichten, undated copy, E 40/72 Bü 553, emphasis in the original; on the date see GLAK, Änderungswünsche des Karlsruher Innenministeriums zur Wiedergabe des in Berlin bereits veröffentlichten Interviews, 22/1/1915, 456 F8/316 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "Der Ausgang des Krieges hängt nicht allein von der Armee ab. Zur anderen Hälfte bestimmt das Volk selbst den Ausgang des Krieges. Die Haltung, die wir hier zuhause zeigen, wirkt durch Millionen Fäden zurück auf die Haltung unserer Soldaten").
    64. ^ For example, on the foundation of the Bild- und Filmamt in 1917, see Creutz, Pressepolitik 1996, p. 169.
    65. ^ Götter, Wirkungsannahmen 2016, pp. 136f.
    66. ^ For instructions of this kind from 1916, see Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich (BayHStA), Kriegspresseamt 5534 O.Z., 8./11.2.1916, StvGenKdoIAK 1740 and BayHStA, MKr 13873.
    67. ^ The National Archives, Kew (TNA), Memorandum on the German System of Press Control and Propaganda, MI7(b), September 1916, WO 106/6397, p. 4.
    68. ^ The National Archives, Kew (TNA), Memorandum on the German System of Press Control and Propaganda, MI7(b), September 1916, WO 106/6397, pp. 18 f., p. 25; also TNA, GHQ to Macdonogh, 29/12/1916, WO 158/897; TNA, Macdonogh to Charteris, 31/12/1916, WO 158/897.
    69. ^ BAMA, Boy-Ed to Holtzendorff, presumably in June 1916, RM 5/3736, Bl. 28 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "die Seekriegführung, wenn immer es durch die Presse möglich ist, zu unterstützen").
    70. ^ BAMA, Boy-Ed to Nicolai, P 1464, 3/8/1916, BAMA, RM 5/3740, Bl. 93 f (transl. by N. Williams, original: "ein solcher der öffentlichen Meinungen geworden", "Die Taten allein tun es in unserer Zeit der Presse-Herrschaft eben nicht!").
    71. ^ GLAK, Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Ia/IIIb 6022 geh. Op., Aufgaben und Organisation der Militärischen Stelle des Auswärtigen Amtes (M.A.A.), 7/1/1918, 456 F1/372 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "die militärischen Erfolge der deutschen Waffen durch Aufklärungsarbeit mittels Feder, Bild und Film und mündliche Propaganda im neutralen und feindlichen Ausland politisch auszuwerten").
    72. ^ GLAK, Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Ia/IIIb 6022 geh. Op., Aufgaben und Organisation der Militärischen Stelle des Auswärtigen Amtes (M.A.A.), 7/1/1918, 456 F1/372 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "Hilfsmittel zur Erreichung des Sieges").
    73. ^ GLAK, Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Ia/IIIb 6022 geh. Op., Aufgaben und Organisation der Militärischen Stelle des Auswärtigen Amtes (M.A.A.), 7/1/1918, 456 F1/372 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "durch richtige propagandistische Auswertung unserer militärischen Siege den Kriegswillen der feindlichen Heimatarmeen zu zertrümmern").
    74. ^ TNA, Charteris to Macdonogh, 21/7/1916, WO 158/897; Charteris, John: At G.H.Q. London 1931, p. 167; Hiley, War 1984, pp. 506, 509.
    75. ^ Bar-Yosef, Crusade 2001, p. 100; Lloyd George, Memoirs 1934, pp. 1829–1831.
    76. ^ TNA, The Organisation and Functions of the Ministry of Information, Beaverbrook, September 1918, Inf 4/9, p. 11.
    77. ^ Balfour, Propaganda 1979, pp. 1–10.
    78. ^ On this belief, see for example Ponsonby, Falsehood 1928.
    79. ^ GLAK, Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Op. Gruppe IV, 19950 b. geh., 6/11/1918, 456 F1/377 (transl. by N. Williams, original: "durch planmäßige Propaganda […] die Stimmung in Heimat und Heer bei uns herabzudrücken").
    80. ^ Barth, Dolchstoßlegenden 2003, particularly pp. 220–223, 359–362, 540–545.

    Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag Creative Commons Lizenzvertrag
    Dieser Text ist lizensiert unter This text is licensed under: CC by-nc-nd 3.0 Germany - Attribution, Noncommercial, No Derivative Works

    Übersetzt von:Translated by: Niall Williams
    Fachherausgeber:Editor: Johannes Paulmann
    Redaktion:Copy Editor: Claudia Falk

    Eingeordnet unter:Filed under:



    : The First World War as a media event, in: Europäische Geschichte Online (EGO), hg. vom Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG), Mainz European History Online (EGO), published by the Leibniz Institute of European History (IEG), Mainz 2021-08-26. URL: URN: urn:nbn:de:0159-2021082304 [JJJJ-MM-TT][YYYY-MM-DD].

    Bitte setzen Sie beim Zitieren dieses Beitrages hinter der URL-Angabe in Klammern das Datum Ihres letzten Besuchs dieser Online-Adresse ein. Beim Zitieren einer bestimmten Passage aus dem Beitrag bitte zusätzlich die Nummer des Textabschnitts angeben, z.B. 2 oder 1-4.

    When quoting this article please add the date of your last retrieval in brackets after the url. When quoting a certain passage from the article please also insert the corresponding number(s), for example 2 or 1-4.